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Taxation as a Global Socio-Legal Phenomenon 
 
Allison Christians∗
Steven Dean 
Diane Ring 
Adam H. Rosenzweig 
 
This essay makes a proposal that may not be controversial among those with a 
particular interest in international law, but may be less accepted among those primarily 
interested in tax law:  that international social and institutional structures shape, and are 
shaped by, historical and contemporary domestic policy decisions.  As a result, to 
incorporate these lessons, tax scholarship should turn to fields such as international 
relations, organizational theory, and political philosophy to provide a broader framework 
for understanding the rapid changes that are taking place in tax policy and politics in the 
United States and around the world.  
What is clear to those interested in tax law is that our field presents an 
increasingly technocratic thicket of special rules, principles, and standards intended to 
accomplish goals of varying comprehensibility and coherence.  Many—perhaps most—
who study tax law concern themselves with the policy goals and outcomes of a given 
system as described and implemented through these rules, standards, and principles, 
including legislative, judicial, and administrative efforts.  Some scholars are explicit 
about their focus on a particular bounded society; others may be less explicit, but rely 
equally on the idea that tax law and tax policy are by their nature products and functions 
of people gathered within, and defined by, sovereign states. 
Yet it is equally clear that the subjects of taxation—both people and activities, to 
different degrees—are increasingly free in their movement across physical boundaries.  
The four authors presenting this essay count themselves among a growing number of tax 
scholars who are becoming increasingly convinced that the international flow of capital, 
people, presents us with a fundamentally and significantly goods, and, to a lesser extent, 
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changing role for legal systems and institutions that tax scholarship has not confronted as 
fully as other fields.1   
Our aim in this essay, and in collaborating over our working papers at venues 
such as the 2007 ILA annual conference in New York, is to further the emergent dialogue 
between tax law scholars and international law scholars about how law and institutions 
evolve in our globalized world.  Tax scholarship could benefit from the expertise of those 
who have focused in more depth on how international organizations, transnational 
networks, and non-state institutions and actors shape business and investment activities 
and their regulation in a world of increasingly diffuse interests and resources.  In turn, 
uncovering the particular ways in which international tax systems, institutions and 
organizations develop uniquely and independently from those in related fields, such as 
environmental regulation and international trade, can contribute to the broader 
understanding of such organizations and institutions and how they impact the 
development of the rule of law in global society. 
To that end, each of us presents below a brief introduction to a line of inquiry that 
we suggest could add to the story of how tax law is evolving in the United States and 
globally.  The common thread of these inquiries is that each focuses on understanding the 
structure of what has been described as a “flawed miracle:” the modern international tax 
regime.2  The existence of such a regime, assuming it is properly so designated, is a 
miracle in the sense that, despite the lack of any explicit multilateral agreement, there 
appears to be consensus on at least some fundamental issues of taxation among a fairly 
large, and perhaps growing, number of countries.3    
But the miracle is flawed because of the failure of states to agree sufficiently on 
key areas, which has had far-reaching and unanticipated an increasingly lengthy list of 
                                                             
1  Some  examples  include  Arthur  J.  Cockfield,  The  Rise  of  the  OECD  as  Informal  ‘World  Tax 
Organization’ Through National Responses  to E­Commerce Tax  Challenges,  8  Yale  J.  L.  &  Tech.  136 
(2006); Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 Va. L. 
Rev. 1753 (1995).; Reuven S. Avi‐Yonah,  International Tax as International Law, 57 Tax L. Rev. 483 
(2004); Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and  the Taxation of  International  Income,  29 Law & Pol'y  Int'l 
Bus.  145  (1998);  Peggy  B.  Musgrave,  Sovereignty,  Entitlement,  and  Cooperation  in  International 
Taxation, 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 1335 (2001); Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 443 (2007); and Tsilly Dagan, National Interests in the International Tax Game, 18 VA. 
TAX  REV. 363, (1998).  This is, of course, not an exhaustive list. 
2 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1301 (1996). 
3 Reuven Avi-Yonah is the principal proponent of the theory that there is an international tax regime. See 
Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation, supra note 2.  Others, such as David Rosenbloom, are 
skeptical that the collection of international agreements and commonality of particular rules, principles, or 
standards, can truly be cons idered a regi me at al l. See, e.g., H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax 
Arbitrage and the “International Tax System", 53 Tax L. Rev. 137 (2000). 
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effects.  In effect, the flaw of the modern miracle is a series of unrelieved collective 
action problems among states, each multiplying the harm of the other, resulting in 
policies across borders that distort behavior and decision-making of individuals.  Among 
such problems identified in the international tax law literature are international tax 
arbitrage and the increasingly complex matter of tax competition.  The cumulative impact 
of this growing web of collective action problems is the potential demise of the ability of 
any one country, regardless of size, to effectively collect sufficient revenue to support its 
public needs, at the very time a growing inequality of the distribution of social burdens 
and benefits is being perceived worldwide.4
The need for revenue to address this global public goods concern,5 and the 
increasing unease about the distributional effects of regulation in an economically 
integrated world, require that this web of collective action problems be addressed and, if 
possible, overcome.  Correspondingly, the conception of the modern state itself has 
increasingly become co-extensive with the construct of citizenship, incorporating ideas 
about political, social, and economic rights and obligations to connect peoples with 
particular governments and the world.  Certainly no single state can exist as a going 
concern without raising revenues, and just as certainly it cannot raise revenues without 
some plausible connection to persons and property as revenue sources.  Further, states 
cannot raise revenue effectively or fairly in the modern international economic regime 
without interacting with other states, and their citizens, as people, goods, services and 
capital increasingly cross global borders.  International tax law thus inexorably 
intertwines with the broader sovereign authority of the state itself, including its 
connections with, and to, its citizenry and the other nations of the world. 
Traditional approaches to international tax scholarship have generally analyzed 
the law in terms of pursuing the dual policies of worldwide economic efficiency and the 
equitable distribution of the international tax burden.  One striking feature of this 
traditional approach is that it is both unilateral and Ameri-centric.  To the extent other 
countries are involved, their taxes are often considered only as a cost to be taken into 
account in applying the above policies.   
Approaching international taxation as an inherently global socio-legal 
phenomenon would require a departure from this approach, one in which the international 
tax regime is analyzed as the interaction of people, capital, business, other institutions, 
and states, rather than purely as a cost of global capital investment.  Such an approach 
ng of the scope of the literature incorporated in the tax law would require both a broadeni
                                                             
4 For example, as measured by an increasing gini co-efficient in an increasing number of countries.  See, 
e.g., United Nations World Income Inequality Database, available at 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/. 
5 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis o f the Welfare State, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (2000) 
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scholarship and a departure from the traditional baselines for analysis.  For example, the 
literature could begin to incorporate the lessons from multiple areas of scholarship, 
including international relations theory, sovereignty theory, political philosophy, political 
economy, and behavioral game theory, so as to begin to understand the changing 
pressures on taxation that are emerging as a result of the increasingly complex 
relationship between states, markets, and people in the globalized world. 
Each of us has begun to consider the broad outlines of these inquiries, and 
presents a particular focus below. 6   
I. International Relations Theory and International Tax7 
Given the critical role of taxation and revenue for national governments, 
combined with the high (and continually growing) volume8 of cross border business, 
disagreement is inevitable over whose tax rules should apply, what those rules should be 
and what role each country should play.  How are these international tax disputes 
resolved?  When and under what circumstances are countries able to reach agreement on 
these tax-based conflicts?  The international tax literature has devoted tremendous 
resources to considering substantive issues in international taxation.  Little attention, 
however, has been directed to how conflict is handled—essentially the “relations” aspect 
of international tax.  Where can we look for a deeper understanding of these fundamental 
concerns? 
Cross-border conflict is not confined to the field of taxation; virtually all social 
and commercial behavior can generate international disagreement.  The international 
relations literature is devoted to examining questions of relationships, roles, conflicts and 
cale and across a wide range of substantive topics.solutions on an international s
                                                            
9  As 
 
6 Each of the four co-authors served as a main contribu tor of one of the four Sections of this Essay, with 
helpful comments and suggestions from the others.  Professor Ring is the principal author of the Section 
titled International Relations Theory and International Tax; Professor Christians is the principal author of 
the Section titled The Role of Sovereignty in the Development of Tax Law; Professor Dean is the principal 
author of the Section titled Political Economy and International Tax; and Professor Rosenzweig is th e 
principal author of the Section titled Group Dynamics, Game Theory and International Tax.   
7 Professor Ring has di scussed these issues in greater depth in prior articles.  See, e.g., Diane M. Ring,  
International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, 60 T AX L. REV. 83 ( 2007); Diane M. Ring, One 
Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REV. 79 (2002). 
8 The U.S. Tre asury Department recently observed that “[t]he United States is increasingly linked to the 
world economy through trade and investment. Capital now flows more freely across the globe. Businesses 
start up and operate m ore freely across borde rs, and business location and investment decisions are more 
sensitive to tax and regulatory structures than in the past.” Treasury Department, Conference on Business 
Taxation and Global Competitiveness Background Paper (July 23, 2007). 
9 See, e.g., James E. Dougherty & Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations 
28-34 (5th Ed. 20 01); Arthur Stein, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE (1990); Barry Bu zan, Charles Jones & 
Richard Little, THE LOGIC OF ANARCHY: NEOREALISM TO STRUCTURAL REALISM (1993);  
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international tax increasingly turns its attention to the impact of state-to-state dynamics, 
multiple players,10 and intersecting issues, the analyses and insights from international 
relations research will move to the fore.  Although it can be daunting to begin the process 
of synthesizing such an expansive field of literature as international relations for the 
purpose of integrating it into international tax theory and policy, the effort is invaluable 
and ultimately essential. 11   
For example, by drawing upon the work in “regime theory”12 from the 
international relations field, we can develop models for evaluating when countries are 
likely to reach a resolution on a significant issue of tax law or procedure (i.e. create a 
“regime”).  Even the narrow dimension of the international relations theory literature 
subsumed under the heading of regime theory is not monolithic but rather incorporates 
several different strands and models, each of which is best understood as applicable to 
different circumstances (depending on whether power or other factors such as game 
theory, type of issue, and related background features are more salient) and not 
competing for complete analytic superiority.  Thus, regime theory analysis provides a 
new lens through which to understand one of the central features of the international tax 
system --the regime for avoidance of double taxation which is significantly implemented 
through income tax treaties.   
The effort to interpret the past 90 years of double taxation policy and practice 
through the framework of regime theory encourages us to: (1) understand that double 
taxation policy includes principles (e.g., double taxation is harmful), norms (e.g., 
residence should yield to source) and rules (e.g., details for coordinating the countries’ 
tax laws) – each of which plays a different role in the nature and degree of conflict and 
agreement among states;13 (2) consider the impact of “power” as compared to game 
theory, type of issue, and pairing of states in understanding regime formation; (3) 
examine the relationship between a game theory description of the regime process and 
14 (4) contemplate the role played by nonstate actors in the the types of states involved;  
regime process.15   
                                                             
10 For a consideration of nonstate actors on the global stage, see, e.g., Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr.,  supra 
note 8 at 28-34 (5th Ed. 2001); Peter Willetts, Transnational Actors and International Organizations in 
Global Politics, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 356, 362-66, 369-81 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 2d 3d. 2001). 
11 See, generally, Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, supra note 6. 
12 See, e.g ., Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer & Vo lker Rittberger, THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
REGIMES (1997); REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993).  This 
use of the term “regime” from international relations theory is narrower and more precise than the general 
usage seen, for example, in characterizing the international tax system as an “international tax regime.”  See 
supra text accompanying notes 1 and 2. 
13 Ring, supra note 6 at 147. 
14 The implications of game theory in international tax are con sidered below in Part IV by Adam 
Rosenzweig. 
15 Ring, supra note 6 at 147-48. 
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The application of regime theory to the double taxation case study serves as a 
window onto the possible relationship between international tax and international 
relations theory.  First, a regime theory approach can be used to illuminate other issues 
currently under debate in the international tax arena, including tax competition, transfer 
pricing, and arbitrage.  Second, with increased experience we may develop a better sense 
of what factors are likely to contribute to regime formation in international tax, and what 
factors are mostly likely to be problematic.  Third, regime theory directs our attention to 
the powerful impact of nonstate actors including international organizations and 
multinational corporations on the development of international tax policy and practice.   
Each of the above points emerging from regime theory work will benefit from 
continued research and analysis within international tax.  However, regime theory is not 
international relations theory’s only potential contribution to international tax.  Two other 
particularly important strands from international relations theory include: (1) the role of 
sovereignty in regime formation and failure, and (2) the impact of a state’s domestic tax 
and political situation on its international tax policy.  Two of us (Diane Ring and Allison 
Christians)16 are currently examining taxation and sovereignty, and two of us (Steven 
Dean and Adam Rosenzweig) are pursuing the impact of domestic politics and group 
dynamics on international taxation17 --  all with the expectation that international tax will 
be enriched through this expanded scope of inquiry which recognizes the powerful link 
between international tax and international relations. 
II. The Role of Sovereignty in the Development of Tax Law18 
Professor Ring’s work on regime theory in international taxation highlights how 
important core international law concepts can be for understanding how tax law is 
evolving in the United States and elsewhere.  When ideas change about the meaning and 
significance of concepts such as sovereignty—what it is, and what is implies for those 
who make, implement, and try to abide by what they consider to be law—the 
implications can be significant even if it is not clear why or how the conceptions have 
changed and are changing.  Admittedly, a simple inquiry into the connection between 
taxation and sovereignty is not particularly novel—a people’s right to establish its own 
tax system, often labeled “tax sovereignty,” as classically described by Schumpeter is a 
scholarship.well-accepted construct in tax 
                                                            
19   Even so, many of the ideas we tax scholars 
 
16 Diane Ring, Sovereignty in In ternational Tax, (2008), working paper on file with the authors; Allison 
Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation, and Social Compact: The OECD’s Search for Global Tax Policy 
Standards (2008), working paper on file with the authors. 
17 Steven Dean, infra Part III; Adam Rosenzweig, infra Part IV. 
18 Professor Christians explores these issues in detail in other work.  See, e.g., Allison Christians, Hard 
Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 3 25 (2007); Sovereignty, Taxation, and 
Social Compact, supra note 15. 
19  Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Crisis of the Tax State (1918), reprinted in International Economic Papers 
(Peacock, Stolper, Turvey and Henderson, eds., 1954). 
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seem to hold about sovereignty have been fairly thin, and some of our key assumptions 
seem to be undergoing major challenges and changes.  It seems clear that tax scholars 
could benefit from studying a more fully developed scholarship on the nature of 
sovereignty as a constraint on law from a theoretical and philosophical as well as 
instrumentalist perspective.   
As is the case in many other regulatory policy areas, globalization has brought 
transnational and international issues to the fore in domestic tax policy debates.  At issue 
for those interested in how the benefits and burdens of taxation are shared among the 
members of societies is what states can or should do to regulate economic activity in an 
age in which sovereign borders mean little for the flow of economic activity yet 
potentially constrain the rule of law.  To overcome the potential constraints of national 
borders on the regulation of international activity, domestic policymakers are 
increasingly using transnational networks, such as the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), as places to coordinate and forge consensus on 
tax practices and related regulatory issues.20  In confronting the collective action 
problems posed by the international tax regime, these policymakers are rethinking what 
sovereignty does, can, and should mean in a globalized world.  
A major example of this rethinking has emerged in the OECD’s work on curbing what 
they describe as harmful tax practices.21  In the relatively short amount of time since the 
OECD began this initiative, a significant body of scholarship has emerged to try to 
understand and explain what exactly the OECD’s role is, can, or should be in shaping 
domestic tax law.22   Substantively, the OECD’s work illustrates the difficulty of 
overcoming global collective action problems in the absence of a multilateral agreement 
 for resolving disputes such as the WTO.  The OECD’s such as the GATT and a forum
                                                             
20 The OECD is a th irty-member international organization that includes most of the world’s largest 
economies, including the United States, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, but not including China 
or India.  See OECD, Ratification of the Convention on the OECD and OECD Member Countries, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html.  The OECD 
develops tax policy guidance that both encapsulates and sets international tax standards in what are usually 
referred to as “international” issue areas such  as tran sfer pricing in multinational firms and cross-border 
income tax coordination.  It serves as a forum for consensus-building among interested parties rather than a 
body for creating laws with which its members are expected to comply.  As s uch, it operates m ore like a 
transnational network than a supranational organization.  See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A NEW WORLD 
ORDER (2004) at 11 -13, 145 (Describing a tr ansnational network as a h orizontal network of national 
officials that builds consensus among the members but may be “decentralized and dispersed, incapable of 
exercising centralized coercive authority,” and a supranational organization as a vertical network used by 
“states to delegate their sovereignty to an institution above them with real [coercive] power.”) Id. at 13.  
Nevertheless, many of the OECD’s decla rations in tax matters may be accepted by some as largely 
equivalent to binding law.  See, e.g., Allison Christians, Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 
supra note 18. 
21 See http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_33745_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
22 See discussion in Christians, Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, supra note 18. 
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work has demonstrated that striving for coherency within any one tax system is becoming 
an increasingly futile effort without achieving virtually global adherence to some 
fundamental, globally agreed-upon tax policy principles.  But this recognition uncovers 
major challenges for national policymakers, who must determine both what justifies any 
given choice of principles and on what basis one sovereign state can compel any other to 
adhere to any given choices.   
Some kind of framework is needed to debate the principles themselves as well as the 
theoretical justification for their implementation.  One such framework that seems worth 
exploring is found primarily in political philosophy and international relations literature: 
that of defining and understanding the role of a social contract in constraining the 
behavior of individual societies for the benefit of the community of societies as a whole.  
Through its initiative, the OECD is implicitly advancing the existence of a global social 
compact that constrains states to regulate in a way that prioritizes community-wide 
fairness in tax policy over competition among states.23  This work suggests that 
interpreting the OECD’s work on harmful tax competition as a forging, or defining, of a 
social contract is one way to frame the issues for debate on both the substantive merits 
(which rules, standards and principles are being chosen) and instrumental ones (how the 
goals are being developed, implemented, and monitored).    
This work argues that key players in the OECD are implicitly advancing a theory that 
sovereign states, by virtue of their membership in international society, are obligated to 
design their tax systems according to a set of fundamental principles agreed upon by the 
OECD.  These policymakers are working together to create consensus positions and 
disseminating these positions with justificatory rhetoric regarding whether and how 
countries must cooperate in tax policy formulation.  Their main principle seems to be that 
nation states have, as a function of their membership as respected sovereign entities in 
international society, a duty to design their tax systems in ways that are responsive to 
global community goals, even when these conflict with domestic goals.    
This principle, and an evolving theory about sovereignty and a social compact, emerges 
from the language developed by international experts and officials over time to defend 
tax sovereignty while simultaneously advancing universality in several key areas of tax 
policy.  The rhetoric of those who shape international tax policy gives us clues about 
what the rule makers, and those who reflect on the rules, think is important and 
appropriate, as well as what they think is unimportant or inappropriate, at any given time.   
Using a social contract approach is one way to explore emerging ideas and perceptions 
about what states owe each other, and to recognize that these ideas and perceptions are 
constantly evolving.  Searching for changes in thinking about what tax sovereignty means 
used by international experts and policymakers is a starting within the language currently 
                                                             
23 See Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation, and Social Compact: The OECD’s Search for Global Tax Policy 
Standards (2008), supra note 16. 
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point for addressing the larger question of what sovereignty does or should entail for 
taxation in a globalized world.  
III. Political Economy and International Taxation24 
 Making sense of the relationships that form the international tax regime represents 
an enormous, perhaps insurmountable,25 challenge.  As discussed above, one way to 
conceptualize those relationships is to picture states as citizens of a global community 
committed to observing norms of behavior that advance the collective interests of that 
community.  The concept of state as citizen invites a number of compelling questions.  
One is whether states are “members of a close-knit group” of the type that can sustain the 
informal norms that can create “Order without Law”26 so that the community’s interests 
are served despite the absence of a formal supra-national governance structure.27  A 
second is a question that international tax scholars have only begun to confront.28  The 
notion that individuals often act irrationally and counter to their own best interests is well 
entrenched among legal scholars.  The question international tax scholars must grapple 
with is whether there is any reason to expect better of our metaphorical citizen-states.  
Assuming that it is possible for large groups of individuals to agree on the nature of their 
collective best interests,29 how likely are national governments to translate their rational 
desires into coherent laws, treaties and policies?  There are good reasons to doubt the 
results that even well-intentioned legislators produce.30  The link between a nation’s 
collective well-being and the actions of its government is likely to be even more 
                                                             
24 Professor Dean has explored related themes in two prior articles.  See Steven Dean, The Incomplete 
Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L REV. (forthcoming, 2008);  Steven Dean, Philosopher Kings 
and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 911 (2007). 
25 It m ay even be worth asking whether any such system exists.  See Rosenbloom, International Tax 
Arbitrage and the “International Tax System", supra note 3 (“What, exactly, is th is ‘international tax 
system’ that the Committee invoked? Is it real? Currently functioning?”).  Pro fessor Ring’s work, for 
example, demonstrates that we cannot hope to find answers unless we go beyond the traditional approach to 
tax scholarship into literatures that expressly try to resolve such questions. 
26 Ellickson, Robert C., ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES, 167 (1991). 
27 Such as that presented by the WTO. 
28 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax Policy? 60 TAX 
L. REV 155 (2007) (considering why it mig ht be rational for nations to pursue policies that advance 
worldwide welfare).   
29 Are we strict utilitarians attempting to achieve the highest possible GDP?  Rawlsians intent on achieving 
a fair distribution of well-being?  Radical environmentalists?   
30 “Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem” does not o ffer much reason for optimism on this front.  “In  1972, 
Kenneth Arrow won the Nobel Prize in large part for proving mathematically that no legislative process 
can simultaneously satisfy… five assumptions on legislative fairness… and  remain rational, where 
rationality is defined as t he capability of aggregating individual preferences into transitive group 
orderings.”  Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1224 
(1994). 
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attenuated when the role of special interests and the other foibles of the domestic political 
process are taken into account.   
 Still, accepting that domestic politics and the inherent limitations of government 
play a significant role in determining the shape of the international tax regime is not 
tantamount to rejecting the possibility that international tax scholars can understand and 
even help to improve that regime.  In fact, just the opposite may be true.  With the right 
tools, including the theoretical insights offered by international law scholars,31 students 
of the international tax regime may be in a position to answer questions that would 
otherwise defy rational explanation.  For example, domestic political considerations 
might explain why existing bilateral tax treaties do a good job of ensuring that taxpayers 
are not subject to duplicative taxes but do little to help extend the administrative reach of 
national tax authorities beyond national boundaries (even if both would increase the 
treaty partners’ economic welfare).32  Expanding the focus of international tax 
scholarship to consider these themes, along with the others described in this Essay, would 
help to provide policymakers with both a more accurate snapshot of the international tax 
regime and a greater capacity to shape its development. 
IV. Group Dynamics, Game Theory and International Tax33 
 As with those issues discussed above, applying game theory to the international 
relations of states generally, and to the tax relations of states specifically, is not new.34  
Further, the recognition in the realm of international relations and international law that 
states rarely fit the traditional unitary actor model is not novel either, with public choice 
theory among others providing alternative, and at times persuasive, arguments to explain 
the rise of particular state policies.35  As the unitary actor model of the state becomes 
increasingly challenged outside of international tax scholarship,36 the assumption of the 
state as a unitary actor in game theoretical approaches to international tax grows 
decreasingly persuasive.  Correspondingly, the predictions to be made from a particular 
ary actor may not necessarily conform to reality, even if the 
ry effect.   
model using the state as a unit
game has persuasive explanato
                                                             
31 Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 469, 514-19 (2005) (creating a comprehensive framework for predicting  the  likelihood that 
nations will commit to and comply with international regimes). 
32 See Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, supra note 23 (discussing the differing 
fortunes of the early League of Nations anti-double tax and administrative assistance treaties). 
33 Professor Rosenzweig has focused on these issues in previous work.  See Adam Rosenzweig, Harnessing 
the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555 (2007). 
34 For an overview, see Ring,  International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, supra note 6. 
35 See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law , 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679 
(2003). 
36 See, e.g., Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, The Decline of the Nation State and its Effects on 
Constitutional and International Economic Law: A Public Choice Model of International Economic 
Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925 (1996). 
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Introducing group dynamics into game theory, or incorporating groups and sub-
group dynamics into the models, may provide an avenue with which to understand this 
disconnection.37   International law and international relations theorists have begun to 
incorporate these multi-layered group dynamics into their models of how societies, 
through groups, governments or otherwise, and states interact with each other.38  What is 
emerging from this work is that private actors interacting with each other across borders 
can impact not only how any one state interacts with other states, but also how such 
private actors interact with each other within their own borders.39  As groups of private 
actors internalize norms through such interactions across borders, their influence on the 
policies of their particular state may change as well.  In other words, it is the increasing 
globalization of people, goods and capital itself which may be changing the terms of the 
game, by transforming both the internal and external incentives of countries and their 
citizens. 
This is a potentially powerful conclusion for the field of international tax law.  As 
people, goods and capital increasingly cross state borders, and as more states are brought 
into the international tax discussion, it may be necessary to more directly confront the 
possibility that group dynamics are changing the way to conceptualize a game theoretical 
model of international tax.  Doing so would not only provide further support to the 
existing explanatory game theory models of international tax, but could also significantly 
increase their predictive power as well.  Taken to its logical, but not necessarily 
inevitable, conclusion, focusing the international tax laws on these group dynamics could 
itself change the group dynamics, potentially leading to a more optimal worldwide tax 
system.40
                                                             
37 See Paul G. Mahoney and Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, 91 
CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2003). 
38 See, e.g., Alex Geisinger and Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law, 60 Vand. 
L. Rev. 77 (2007);  Ch arles K. Whitehead, What’s Your Sign? – International Norms, Signals, and 
Compliance, 27 Mich. J. Int'l L. 695 (2006);  Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective 
Action, and the Law, 102 Mich. L. R ev. 71 (2003); see also Brent Simpson, Social Values, Subjective 
Transformations, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 67 Soc. Psych. Q. 385 (2004); Peter Kollock, 
Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 Ann. Rev. Soc. 183 (1998). 
39 See, e.g., Kahan supra note 38 at 71 (“This set of dynamics--which I propose to refer to as the “logic of 
reciprocity”--suggests not only an alternative account of when collective-action problems will arise, b ut 
also an alternative program for solving (or simply avoiding) them through law.”); Whitehead supra note 38 
at 696 (“The unitary model, consequently, understates the impact on compliance of informal pressures at 
the small group and individual levels, and of potentially competing interests between domestic and 
international state representatives.”); Simpson supra note 38 at 386 (“it follows that a tendency for actors to 
transform [Prisoners Dilemma] into [an Assurance Game] would have important implications for how 
groups solve social dilemmas”). 
40 See, e.g., Geisinger and Stein supra note 38 at  112 (“When norms are unce rtain, the process of 
international law making can serve to construct normative beliefs.”) 
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This is not to say that game theory is a panacea for international tax cooperation.  
The literature is littered with the remains of theories claiming such authority in the past.  
It may, however, have more relevance than perhaps some would attribute, even given its 
limitations, if broader global socio-legal interactions are incorporated into the models so 
as to more closely tailor their explanatory power with the reality seen in the modern 
world.   
V. Conclusion 
Contemporary tax scholars face a daunting task in redefining the contours of a 
rich body of literature, created by generations of professors, practitioners and 
policymakers, to reflect a swiftly evolving international environment.  Fortunately, the 
work of international law scholars, among others, offers insights that make that task 
much more manageable.  The four lines of inquiry we have outlined here represent just a 
few ways to approach the complex web of interrelated issues that make up the global 
social, economic, and legal landscape of which taxation plays a part.  Each is part of a 
search for more comprehensive analytical tools to assess tax policy decisions that are 
being made by national, subnational, and transnational bodies.  As the line between 
national and international blurs in taxation as it has in other regulatory fields, tax 
scholarship can benefit from the analytical work being done by others who have grappled 
with the role and reach of international actors, institutions, organizations, and 
frameworks.  We hope that this essay furthers this kind of study. 
 
 
